Saturday, July 03, 2010

Kant and Aristotle on Goodness

"Kant thinks that the ground and source of all goodness (of the moral kind) lies in the will, and that a 'good will' is one that is determined by the moral law, which is what reason demands of the will in forming its ends or objectives in action. So a good *action* is only good because it has been guided by a good will, one sensitive to the demands of reason (and these can be ferreted out by applying the categorical imperative as a test for whether or not a given proposed action satisfies those demands), which detects the moral law (under the right conditions). Yet it is the goodness of the *end* to which the will (and therefore the action) is directed that matters, and so, in fact, Kant would not say that intentions are more important than actions, but rather, that the latter are determined by the former, and only when the former are guided by a will that is itself determined by the moral law does action satisfy the requirements of the moral law and lead to the best (morally acceptable) results.

Now, Aristotle has a very different analysis of what constitutes the goodness associated with human life, one that depends on excellence in the realization of one's proper (and natural) function(s) (=those functions that are distinctive to you as the kind of creature you are). Here intentions matter, but what determines whether an action is good is whether it involves the realization of excellence in one's functioning. This amounts to a kind of health or well-being that the good person achieves, and their intentions matter less than the results of their actions."

-Excerpted from an e-mail from instructor Jason Potter, University of Colorado at Boulder

Monday, June 30, 2008

Trying

According to Albritton, a philosopher who believes that our wills are perfectly free with no restrictions whatsoever("There is no such thing as an unfree will"), in order to try something, there has to be a likelihood of success. We can't "try" to jump over a building when we're not Superman or try to do 50 push-ups when we never work out. Both Devon Belcher and Shiralee Brindell, a married couple of philosophy instructors at CU, believe in some circumstances, there's nothing you can physically do that would actually count as "trying." In some cases, sadly there may end up being a vast disconnect between the will and the action.

Pride

PRIDE
Cannot refer to:
-a logically private object/something that is exclusively your own
-something that is a public object or achievement. For example, we cannot feel pride about the ocean, because it is not our achievement.

Why do we feel pride for our country? We have very little control over it. We just live here. We do not own it, and we are not responsible for most of its accomplishments.

Mental attitudes that are internally related to their objects may include pride, fear and dismay. For instance, we cannot have fear without a sense of incumbent danger.

Perhaps there are no "private words," or at least there are not according to Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument.

So long as we are somehow responsible for something, we may feel pride about it.

There is a distinction between "pride" and "wanting to congratulate." Wanting to congratulate can have a larger scope, possibly encompassing humankind.

Why is Pride one of the 7 deadly sins anyway?

Saturday, May 03, 2008

Male Feminism According to Kahane, Kimmel, and Myself

While David J. Kahane’s article Male Feminism as Oxymoron did not say that men couldn’t be feminists, it labeled the identity of male feminist as “rife with contradictions” (Kahane 231). So while male feminism may be a little bit oxymoronic, hope remains. I think that male feminists do exist, and they exist in more shades than Kahane lies out in his epistemological article. Kahane himself notes four types of male feminists, but I would like to elaborate on one type I constructed myself while reading this article: the conversationalist.

Most men I know would fall into this category. The conversationalist is open to being enlightened about feminism and oppression, but does not seek out this information on his own accord. While it is interesting and engaging for him to discuss such matters, and he often does so open-mindedly, he does not have a full understanding of the gravity of the situation, a point that Kahane made well in his article. The conversationalist might get involved in an activist feminist movement, but only if it were easy to do. The conversationalist would also recognize the basic dynamics of a feminist problem, but not the deeper elements of that same problem. As Kahane writes, the conversationalist would be happy to enjoy the rewards that come from shallow feminism. In this case, the rewards could include an inward pat on the back and outward appreciation from his feminist friends and girlfriends.

Another main point I want to make is that men ought not to be eliminated from feminism, and I think that Kahane, though male, risks alienating men out of feminist discussion and activism altogether. This would be a horrible occurrence, because as Michael S. Kimmel writes in his article Who’s Afraid of Men Doing Feminism?, “Profeminist men are…necessary but not sufficient elements in feminism’s eventual success” (Kimmel 68). Besides, I am a standpoint epistemologist. I believe that all standpoints ought to be taken into account and combined when one is trying to reach an objective reality. This includes the standpoint of the feminist, both female and male, as well as the non-feminist, both male and female. In my opinion, males ought to be welcomed into the world of feminism. How are men and women going to change any sex-based discrimination if we don’t ally together into a larger force?

Before reading these articles and others in the genres of feminist epistemology and male views on feminism, I never realized the full breadth of concerns regarding the notion of male feminists. There are livid arguments against feminist males, put forth by groups such as “the angry-white-men-in-training” and the patriarchy-baiter (Kimmel 59 and 60). Being a feminist does not make anyone “less of a real man,” nor does it make anyone a femi-Nazi (Kimmel 60). These are common misconceptions, however. I think that some men, probably more than would like to admit, and men who are not of the “angry-white-men-in-training” variety, still covertly think that the act of calling themselves a feminist or standing up for women in anti-feminist contexts would make them look wussy or like less of a man. How do we change this? I don’t think Kahane or Kimmel gave a response to this question, and unfortunately, right now I cannot think of an adequate response, either.

On a different note, I find it interesting that Kimmel thinks that “For men to support feminism…means acknowledging men’s experience of powerlessness…while placing it within a context of men’s aggregate power” (Kimmel 64). I didn’t understand Kimmel’s point that men live in “a place of entitlement unfulfilled,” and because of this he claims that when presented with feminism, men feel “like they will be forced to give up their sense of entitlement [without fulfilling it]” (Kimmel 65). I would like to collect male perspectives on this subject to see if this is an accurate assessment of the situation.

I believe that everyone ought to be a feminist. To me, believing in feminism means believing that when it comes to the sexes, they are equally matched and accordingly, deserve equal rights. I mean this in the sense that man and woman ought to be given equal opportunities in every sphere.

Additionally, I believe that we ought to address “women’s issues” as well as “men’s issues.” Women’s issues rightfully deserve more time, because women are not in charge nor are they entitled, and because there are more patriarchal societal problems that are aimed at women than men. Kimmel and Kahane name a few of them: sexual harassment, date rape, sexist comments, and the list of problems continues. However, men's issues are often overlooked in our society due to their pure nature: many of the issues themselves have as their deepest components the overlooking of such notions as emotions and the power-without-fulfillment paradox.

I would like to congratulate both Kahane and Kimmel for writing well-thought out and impassioned articles on this subject. It makes me want to rejoice that some men care this much about these very important issues. I loved Kahane’s idea of “a flyer headed, ‘So You’re a Male Feminist Professor?’ followed by a checklist” (Kahane 230). Additionally, I thought his four types of male feminist knowledge were very astutely observed.

As for Kimmel, I appreciated his idea of forming an organization that encouraged male support of feminism. His group would be entitled, "the Gentleman's Auxiliary of Feminism" (Kimmel 67). It reminded me of a Facebook group that I once saw entitled, "Straight But Not Narrow." The description of the group is as follows: "For all you guys out there who don't think that having and acknowledging emotions makes you a pussy, who can hug another guy without thinking it gay, and who support feminism because women really do deserve all the same rights as men." Unfortunately, currently that same group only has 5 members, and 3 of them are female.

Thursday, March 27, 2008

Agnosticism and Atheism in The Seventh Seal

Antonious Block is the questioning agnostic. He wishes for there to be a God, but there is no evidence displayed to him that either God or Satan exists, and for him this is eternally frustrating. For him, God is a necessity in order for him to be able to have a meaningful life, and if God was conclusively proven to not exist, then there would be despair and angst and definitely no hope. Life gets emptier for him as he becomes more and more certain that God does not exist. There are very few scenes where things for him have meaning (i.e., the scene where he eats strawberries with Mary and Joseph and their baby).

Meanwhile, the Squire Jons is the already-despairing atheist. Jons has more bitterness in him than Antonious does (at first). With statements like “Love is the blackest of plagues,” Jons broods sulkily, presumably affected by what he assumes to be the truth (i.e., that God does not exist).

Personally, I am a questioning agnostic, and thus I relate more closely to Antonious Block than Jons. I find this more congenial because I believe that despite how much we try, God can never be proven, we can never fully understand It, and I look for evidence in the world, even though I fully know there will never be an answer that I deem to make me believe one way or the other, though I do not despair as Block does.

Slavery Reparations

*Criticisms of David Boonin's Argument for Slave Reparations:*

-Why such a distinction between private and public acts?
-Regardless of whether these acts were private or public, they were committed long in the past, and not by the people who are expected to make reparations. This is unable to be changed. People are not responsible for past acts not committed by themselves.
-Some people's relations were not involved in the slave trade at all & therefore shouldn't have to pay anything
-Some people's relations were not in the U.S. at the time of the slave trade & plantations & therefore shouldn't have to pay anything
-What about all of the other wronged groups over the years? Native Americans, women, minorities, etc. Ought reparations be made to these groups as well?
-Can't prove P3 conclusively
-Car case/slave reparations analogy not analogous enough to make me believe it's equivalent